Do the initial job market conditions really matter for CEO pay? by Cimerova, H
Do the Initial Job Market Conditions
Really Matter for CEO Pay?
Helena C´ımerova´∗
Auckland Centre for Financial Research
This version: October 2013
Abstract
This paper complements the literature on CEO compensation by studying the ef-
fects of job market conditions at the start of future CEOs’ careers. We also contribute
to research on cohort effects in compensation by taking a closer look at the niche job
market for executives. Evidence from other labor market research points to procyclical
cohort effects, positing that favorable initial conditions positively affect careers in the
long run. We find, however, no evidence of persistent rewards for US public firms’
CEOs for starting their career in more successful firms, or for the luck of entering the
job market in a good economy. In a setting with future public-firm CEOs and taking
account of macroeconomic conditions at the start of their careers, our findings rather
suggest that long-term effects are countercyclical: those individuals who start their
careers in a recession, earn a higher CEO pay. We also find that initial job conditions
may yield a higher first CEO compensation but the positive effect dissipates over time.
The findings support the notion that the market for CEOs is efficient.
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1 Introduction
In efficient labor markets, fair compensation is a relevant consideration. Efficiency in the
CEO labor market then means that CEO pay is determined by the CEO’s ability, talent,
exerted effort and her marginal contribution to the value of the company. Efficient labor
markets should recognize the difference between skill and luck, and should not punish for
adverse circumstances beyond an individual’s control. Recent research studying different
niches of the labor market, however, finds that initial job conditions such as the phase
of the business cycle (exogenous shocks) may determine the long-term success of a career
(Oyer, 2006, 2008; Kahn, 2010; Kwon et al., 2010). Should individuals be concerned about
carrying a bad signal (stigma) due to exogenous shocks to the economy at their career start?
We find that the answer may depend on the niche of the labor market.
Despite being seen as an increasingly competitive market (e.g., Murphy, 2012), the exec-
utive job market has not been found immune to shortcomings when it comes to rewarding
CEOs. For example, CEOs may be rewarded or penalized for exogenous firm performance
shocks beyond their control. As for the upside outcomes, weak governance structures create
room for rent extraction by CEOs (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Garvey and Mil-
bourn, 2006), for the downside outcomes, there may be instances of “unfair” CEO dismissal
(Jenter and Kanaan, 2012). We examine the existence and persistence of cohort effects
in compensation for individuals who at some point in their career become CEOs. We ask
whether current CEO compensation, which may be seen as a measure of current success,
depends on initial placement success as measured by first firm size. In particular, is the
quality of a future CEO’s very first job (better initial placement) reflected in higher current
compensation? Our results suggest that it is not the case. After controlling for unobserved
firm heterogeneity, successful initial placement does not seem to matter for current CEO
compensation. In instrumental variables regressions, the results are not supportive of the
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existence of procyclical cohort effects for CEOs of US public companies (contrary to the
findings in the related literature of procyclical cohort effects for many other niches of the
labor market). This finding is robust to different measures of firm size and regression speci-
fications. We find, however, a stronger promotion effect for luckier managers. Although it is
established in the literature that promotions come with large wage increases (e.g., Gibbons
and Waldman, 1999), CEOs who get hired from a top-ranked firm, graduated in favourable
economic times, or started their first job in a good economy receive on average a higher
first compensation than individuals whose career start is marked by recession. This pro-
motion effect seems to dissipate over time.1 CEOs who start in recessions seem to have as
good career prospects and be as well rewarded as their boom counterparts. Furthermore,
results from instrumental variables estimation suggest, at odds with findings of procyclical
effects from other cohort effects research, that “recession CEOs” receive higher CEO pay
than CEOs who entered the job market in good economic times. Robustness results confirm
this finding of countercyclical cohort effects in CEO compensation, suggesting the possibility
that individuals who succeed to enter the job market in adverse economic times represent
on average more talented future CEOs.
We proxy for firm quality with firm size and associate larger firms with higher productivity
and better organizational practices. Whether it is becoming a CEO of a larger firm or just
starting a career in a larger firm, we consider working at larger firms a proxy for a more
successful career start. Starting out at larger, busier firms, firms with more developed internal
labor markets offers more opportunities for learning and human capital accumulation (the
opportunity to work on many different projects) and promotion (Gibbons and Waldman,
2006). Research shows that better managers tend to work for larger firms and CEOs in
larger firms earn more: in highly competitive markets for managerial talent, even a relatively
small difference in managerial talent can bring significant benefits to larger firms (Rosen,
1Compared to previous studies that are observationally constrained to follow individuals often for only
up to 10-15 years, we are able to observe careers for a longer time. For about half of the individuals in our
full sample, the observational period is more than 20 years.
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1982; Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Tervio¨, 2008). Market capitalization - the market value of
equity - is our primary firm size measure since it also reflects the markets’ evaluation of the
firm’s future prospects.2
We instrument the quality of the first job by using several indicators of the overall
economic situation at the time the future CEO took up the first job assignment of her career.
Exogenous shocks influence the likelihood of who enters the “CEO talent pipeline”, thus
having access to more developed internal labor markets and more career opportunities.3 We
establish that, conditional on the controls included in the regression, the economic conditions
at the time of the first job have no effect on CEO pay other than the effect through first job
quality. Thus, we exploit the variation in the indicators for the overall economic situation
as a source of exogenous variation in first job quality, and investigate a causal link going
from first job quality to current job quality. In other words, if we can accept that the overall
econonomic conditions at an individual’s career start are not related to the individual’s
current compensation, and they only influence the individual’s success when entering the job
market, we create a setting closer to a randomized trial (i.e., data that capture randomizing
individuals to cohorts and measure their compensation - as CEOs or not - decades later).
Instrumental variables estimation to some extent alleviates concerns of endogeneity but
there are at least two layers of selection in the data.4 The initial job market conditions are
not the same for all individuals and they do not determine whether an individual becomes a
2Gabaix and Landier (2008) argue in favour of using full market capitalization (total value of debt plus
equity) to predict CEO compensation from the point of view of their model (under the supposition that the
contribution of managerial talent to the firm’s future earnings is permanent, as opposed to temporary) but
also based on empirical data analysis. Given that the market value of equity is the main source of variation
in firms’ market values, our choice of market capitalization of equity for the proxy for firm size and success
is a highly substitutable alternative.
3Despite changes to the traditional executive career paths (e.g., Khurana, 2002; Cappelli and
Hamori, 2004), becoming a suitable CEO candidate often requires a long-term learning process about inter-
nal complexities of organizations and industries. “CEOs are invested heavily in the companies that employ
them and firms likewise in the executives that lead them. Sorting takes place early in careers when the
information about ability and talent is difficult to come by.”(Elson and Ferrere, 2013, p. 121)
4A possible solution to this concern would be a double-selection model, based on Heckman’s selection
model (Heckman, 1979) that uses a two-stage procedure and the inverse Mills’ ratio. However, in-sample
selection issues often make the identification and the validity of such a model’s assumptions debatable.
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CEO or not. All individuals in our dataset make it to the “present” (1992-2007) as CEOs, so
this achievement is “guaranteed” to happen in the data. Thus we cannot really study cohort
effects on a full scale of success in careers by involving and comparing to individuals who
never climb the job ladder to a CEO position. We can only see if the individuals have a more
or less successful CEO career. Also, we are not able to follow all future public-firm CEOs for
the same amount of time. The first job is any first assignment in the individual’s career for
which we have firm-related data, so here again we are constrained to public firms. CEOs fall
out of our observational data, fired, retired, moving to a non-public firm or to a non-CEO job,
or due to other (e.g., personal) reasons but only after they become CEOs. The possibility
that endogenous choices of individuals drive the results requires a careful selection of controls
when performing pooled OLS, least square dummy variable or fixed effects estimation, and
credible choices when it comes to instruments for instrumental variables estimation. The
instrumental variables should influence the dependent variable of interest only indirectly
(valid instruments) while being highly correlated with our endogenous variables (strong
instruments).
As robustness checks, we perform cross-sectional regressions to check for the stability
of coefficient estimates, instrumental variables regressions with an alternative set of instru-
ments, and weak-instrument-robust instrumental variables regressions based on conditional
likelihood ratio confidence intervals. The findings from the robustness analysis suggest coun-
tercyclical cohort effects in CEO compensation.
Several recent papers study cohort effects (in pay, in job rankings, in promotions) in
labor markets for college graduates, PhD economists, investment bankers, executives, blue-
or white-collar workers. Oyer (2006) provides evidence on career stickiness for economist
with a PhD degree. Academics who enter the job market in a recession tend to work for
lower-ranked institutions years later, have lower research output, and are offered less tenure-
tracked positions. Oyer (2008) finds that MBA investment bankers who start careers on Wall
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Street during bullish stock markets are more likely to keep their prestigious position in the
long term, and their earnings are substantially higher than those of MBA graduates whose
prospects were diminished by adverse stock market shocks. Kahn’s (2010) results show
that white male US college graduates who graduate in downturns are at a disadvantage
which translates into significantly lower wages in the medium to long term (as much as two
decades into their careers), and worse career prospects. According to Kwon et al. (2010), the
employment growth rate, rather than the unemployment rate which is widely used in cohort
effects studies, becomes more relevant in determining long-term job attainment. Workers
entering the job market in a recovery phase of a business cycle earn more and get promoted
faster than those who enter during the peak.
In terms of the niche labor market they study, Schoar and Zuo (2012) is the paper closest
to ours. Their results suggest, again, long-term cohort effects present in the executive (CEO)
job market. “Recession CEOs”, i.e. CEOs who started their careers in a recession year, work
on average for smaller companies, and switch less between companies or industries. They are
promoted faster to become CEOs but their first CEO compensation is lower in comparison
to “non-recession CEOs”. Their management styles tend to be more conservative: they hold
less debt, invest less, tend to diversify across segments, and their firms have lower stock
return volatility. While our focus is on the long-term consequences of first job quality for
CEO pay, Schoar and Zuo (2012) study the implications of being a “recession CEO” for
the CEO’s career path, first CEO compensation, and for the strategic decision-making in
firms with these CEOs. The setup for capturing the link from “then” (at the start of the
individual’s career) to “now” (the developments in the individual’s CEO career) is different.
We instrument the first job quality measure by a wider array of measures for initial job
market conditions, and consider implications for CEO pay only. Schoar and Zuo (2012)
study a variety of response variables but use a single indicator variable, instrumented by the
individual’s age, for conditions at the start of the individual’s career.
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The findings from the research on cohort effects are puzzling in that they all point to-
wards an unexplained persistent effect of the start-of-career macroeconomic conditions on
individuals’ careers. Those who begin in booms seem to get more options for career develop-
ment, reflected also in their higher earnings (procyclical effects).5 But the persistence story
may have many layers. Even if the workings of a suitable underlying model are yet to be
attributed and tested, partial potential explanations are of importance at this point.
According to Kahn (2010), the relative importance of human capital disparities at the
career start, and the ease with which they can be overcome determines how persistent initial
effects are. Arguments concerning persistence versus non-persistence of first job effects can
also be boiled down to a “born or made” (Oyer, 2008), “nature (selection) or nurture (im-
printing)” (Schoar and Zuo, 2012), “skills or luck” (Oyer, 2006) discussion. As Oyer (2008)
puts it, if starting to work on Wall Street, an opportunity that is more easily attainable in
booms, causes one to work there later on, then investment bankers are “made” rather than
“born” to work on Wall Street. In the context of CEO careers and the business cycle, due to
early career experience, managers may acquire a certain set of skills (different for recession
and non-recession managers) and the given cohort of managers becomes more apt to manage
firms either during recessions or during booms. Schoar and Zuo (2012) name it the “imprint-
ing effect”. They distinguish this effect from the “selection effect”, when there are managers
with different sets of skills in each cohort, some better at managing firms during recessions,
some during booms. Firms and managers (CEOs) then match and re-match according to
their needs and abilities along the business cycle.6
In a deeper look at the theories that provide possible explanations for why initial place-
5Certainly, individuals realizing this may time their job market entry to favourable economic times. This
endogeneity issue should be kept in mind when performing empirical tests.
6If the latter effect is at work in the executive labor market, we will probably not find evidence on
persistent influence of initial market conditions. Also, if managers are formed - lastingly “imprinted” - early
on in their careers, then if a recession hits in the middle of their careers (for example, at the time they take up
their first CEO assignment), it will not have long-run consequences for them. In additional, here unreported
work, we perform tests on the persistence of first CEO job effects and find no statistically significant results.
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ment may have long-term effects on one’s career, Kwon et al. (2010) distinguish between
productivity-based and non-productivity-based theories of cohort effects. Productivity-based
theories suggest that starting a career in a good economy, with a better first job, allows to
learn more and develop higher-than-average productivity, and be rewarded by higher-than-
average pay in the long run. Firm-specific human capital, or rather task-specific human
capital (Gibbons and Waldman, 2004; 2006) developed through more advanced on-the-job
training in better quality institutions may make it more advantageous for an individual to
continue working for the same (type of) better-quality firm. Initial match quality, however,
can generate procyclical or countercyclical cohort effects. In the procyclical view, more jobs
available during booms allow workers to find better matches. An argument for countercycli-
cal cohort effects is that during recessions, when there are less jobs available, firms are at an
advantage. The selection process is more careful, firms find better matches (more productive
employees) for the positions they offer and reward them with higher pay. Non-productivity-
based theories suggest that downward rigidity in jobs, long-term contracts, or signalling may
cause procyclical cohort effects without the existence of productivity disparities between co-
horts. Employees hired during recessions may be more willing to sign long-term contracts
with lower long-term wages (consistent with findings of Beaudry and DiNardo, 1991). Also,
the job market may fail to account for the role of luck in the first placement and the first job
may be considered a strong signal of the individual’s ability (Waldman, 1984) even though
it could represent a systematic non-rational behaviour of markets (Oyer, 2006).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and
Section 3 explains our empirical methodology choices. The results and their interpretation
as well as a robustness analysis are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Data
Data-wise we are limited to examining public firms only.7 Data availability due to reporting
requirements and more transparency demanded by regulators from these firms gives us a
kind of an “efficiency” advantage. CEOs of these firms find themselves under more public
scrutiny and under the spotlight of financial markets. We are interested in whether this
scrutiny can ensure that it is the CEOs’ managerial ability rather than lucky circumstances
that shape their career path.
The data for our panel with 13,378 firm-year observations come from several sources.8
Data on firm financials come from Compustat North America Industrial Annual, and for
financial markets related data from CRSP. Data on CEOs’ profile come from BoardEx and
are complemented with compensation data from Execucomp. Further, we gather data from
the Federal Reserve (interest rates), National Bureau for Economic Research (recession in-
dicators) and U.S. Bureau for Labor Statistics (unemployment) to build our instrumental
variables. The dataset follows 1,473 publicly listed companies from the S&P 1500 universe
and their 2,184 CEOs throughout 16 years, from 1992 to 2007.
We apply two conditions to the full sample: the CEO has to be present in the firm for
at least 3 years (Bertrand and Schoar’s (2003) condition for a CEO to leave an imprint on
the company), and we take into account only non-financial firms, i.e. observations for firms
with two-digit SIC codes from 60 to 69 are dropped. Less than 1% (0.87%) of CEOs in our
sample appear as CEOs in another firm of the sample.9
7With data from BoardEx, we can in many cases reconstruct individuals’ entire careers, including positions
in private firms. However, the main measures of success we use (firm size and CEO compensation) are not
available for private firms in our data sources.
8We perform tests with a full sample and several subsamples. Table A1 in Appendix 1 summarizes the
conditions applied to the full sample and subsamples.
9As we discuss in more detail below, because of the small percentage of within-sample movers, accounting
for firm fixed effects almost coincides with employing managerial fixed effects.
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The summary statistics for the full sample and the pairwise correlations for the potential
right-hand-side variables are presented in Table 1 and in Table OA1 in Online Appendix 1,
respectively. The variables computed in a ratio form or variables more prone to measurement
error are winsorized to mitigate the influence of outliers. We apply winsorization below the
1st percentile and above the 99th percentile.
First firm size refers to the size of the firm at the time of our individuals’ first job
assignment for which data is available on her employer - a public company. For a more
complete characterization of our future CEOs’ first employment, there are four measures
of “first firm size” that appear in the statistical description of the data in Table 1: First
Market Capitalization, First Total Assets, First Sales and First Number of Employees.10
We report regression results with only two of them, First Market Capitalization and First
Total Assets. Since we focus on the success in publicly listed companies, we consider market
capitalization, our market-related measure, the most relevant measure for first firm size and
quality. The correlation coefficient between First Market Capitalization and our alternative
firm size measure, First Total Assets, is 0.881.
Given the availability of compensation data in Execucomp, we follow CEOs at S&P
1500 companies. The average firm at the time of our individuals’ first assignment as a
CEO in a public company has a market capitalization of $2.57 billion (median value $434.5
million), total assets of $2.27 billion (median value $368.6 million), annual sales of $30.5
million (median value $5.86 million), and employs 2.13 million employees (median 412,220
10All four are commonly used in the literature but they are not interchangeable and may produce divergent
conclusions in different settings (Smyth et al., 1975; Shalit and Sankar, 1977). Unreported in Table OA1
in Online Appendix 1, the four firm size measures are highly correlated in-sample. The strongest corre-
lation arises between First Total Assets and First Sales (0.936), and the weakest between First Market
Capitalization and First Number of Employees (0.742). Sales is a measure less susceptible to accounting
manipulation than total assets but there are less observations available - the first year of data availability
for the variable ”SALE” in Compustat is 1975. Another non-accounting measure, number of employees, has
a ”long intellectual tradition” (Rajan et al., 2001). Because of the connection to the stock market, however,
market capitalization seems the most relevant measure for our public firms’ sizes. Moreover conclusions from
regressions with First Sales or First Number of Employees are qualitatively very close to those with First
Total Assets and we do not report these results.
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employees).
As controls at the firm-level, we include those that appear in the compensation regressions
of Graham et al. (2012): lagged market capitalization or lagged total assets, lagged market
to book, stock return and lagged stock return, return on assets and lagged return on assets,
and stock return volatility.11 The pairwise correlations between firm-level controls are rather
low, with the exception of variables and their lagged versions and the alternative firm size
measures. The correlation coefficients between current firm size and first firm size measures
are moderate (between 0.33 - 0.425) which may be caused by persistence in firm size dynamics
- the minimum time difference between “current” and “first” in the full sample is one year.
We address this issue through subsamples, by applying the condition that this difference is
at least 10 years.
We use two measures for CEO compensation. Execucomp’s TDC1, a proxy for grant-date
compensation, comprises of several components in a CEO compensation package: Salary,
Bonus, Other Annual, Total Value of Restricted Stock Granted, Total Value of Stock Options
Granted (using the Black and Scholes option valuation model), Long-Term Incentive Payouts,
and All Other Total. TDC2, a proxy for realized compensation, adds the Net Value of Stock
Options Exercised to the former list of components. The average annual CEO compensation
in our sample is $3.894 million (TDC1 in 2005-constant dollars; includes the value of granted
stock options) and $3.975 million when the net value of exercised option is accounted for
(TDC2 in 2005-constant dollars). The median compensation values are $2.085 million and
$1.598 million (in 2005-constant dollars), respectively.12 The average CEO in our sample
11More detail on these variables can be found in Table A2 in Appendix 2.
12Due to significant changes to executive compensation reporting requirements under the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission regulation, there is a change in the definition of a number of compensation
variables in Execucomp after 2006. A number of compensation variables require adjustments for at least
approximate comparability between the 1992-2005 and 2006-present periods. As suggested and described
in, e.g., Walker (2009) and Maug et al. (2013), for instance the post-2006 TDC1 variable can be considered
approximately equal to the pre-2006 TDC1 minus the value of long term incentive plans (variable LTIP in
Execucomp, which includes the ex-post value of performance shares from TDC1) plus the ex-ante value of
performance shares computed as the product of the target number of performance shares granted to the
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has a CEO tenure of 106 months (8.83 years) and gets her first CEO job in a publicly listed
company at the age of 52.5 years.13 The individuals in our sample graduate on average at
the age of 23.3 years, they start their career (as far as it can be traced back in our data,
not necessarily the first firm if it is a private firm) at the average age of 29.6 years.14 The
average career start in a public company (observations for which we have firm data) happens
at the age of 36.4 years.
Approximately 60% (56.27%) of future CEOs become CEOs in the same public company
where they start their career and around 40% of the CEOs are hired from outside the firm.
5.74% of individuals start in a top-ten company. More than 65% of these CEOs are also the
chairman of the board of directors in addition to their CEO assignment. Around a third of
our CEO-to-be’s have an MBA degree. Only about 1.5% of the individuals in our sample
are women. From among the CEO-level controls, CEO tenure and the CEO & Chairman
indicator have the highest correlation (0.323), suggesting that more experienced CEOs tend
to be more powerful.15 The other pairwise correlations within this group of variables are
close to zero. The CEO-level and firm-level controls are also weakly correlated.
We employ six instrumental variables: (1) The recession indicator equals one if NBER
identified the period at which the future CEO entered the first employer company as con-
traction or through. 15.78% of individuals in our sample start their career in a recession
or through (11.78% when considering only public firms for which we have data). 14.07% of
individuals graduate at the time of a contraction or through. In some instances, for purposes
of comparison, we employ Schoar and Zuo’s (2012) recession-year indicator which identifies
CEO (variable SHRTARG in Execucomp) and end-year stock price. The 2007 compensation data account
for a small percentage of our observations (approximately 6%). The results are virtually unaffected when
we consider adjustments to compensation data after 2006, hence we report only our baseline results without
any pre-2006 or post-2006 adjustments to the compensation variables.
13This relatively young age for first-time CEOs in public firms is consistent with the findings of Schoar
and Zuo (2012) that CEOs born in later decades start their CEO jobs at younger and younger ages. Most
CEOs in our dataset were born in the 1950s and 1960s.
14We can address the concern of data non-availability for private firms by using macro conditions in the
graduation year or at the date of the first position (”reduced-form” regressions).
15On the importance of controlling for CEO power, see, for example, Adams et al. (2005).
12
years of mild economic expansion or recession, i.e. years that do not contain the peak of a
business cycle, at career start. The correlation between the two NBER business cycle classi-
fication based indicators is low (0.0454). The limitation of these indicators is that they are
based on NBER’s ex-post business cycle classification and may not reflect market partici-
pant’s expectations concerning the business cycle at the given historical moment; (2) The av-
erage U.S. unemployment rate for the preceding year is another macroeconomic instrument.
The unemployment rate is a coincident, countercyclical indicator; (3) The investment-grade
bond yield spread is the difference between interest rates on highest quality bonds (Stan-
dard & Poor’s Aaa) and lowest quality bonds (Standard & Poor’s Baa) in the category of
investment-grade bonds. In times of economic strain, this spread is wider. Conditional on
financial markets’ ability to reflect market participants’ expectations of the future (i.e. con-
ditional on financial markets being efficient to some extent), financial indicators such as the
evolution of the S&P 500 composite index or bond yield spreads are useful indicators, readily
available at any phase of the business cycle; (4) The one-year change in the S&P 500 index
volume, (5) the one-year return on the S&P 500, and (6) the standard deviation of returns on
this index of the 500 biggest publicly traded companies are three financial-markets-related
instruments as in Oyer (2008), with which we complement the NBER-classification-based
and macro indicators.
The instruments are weakly or only moderately correlated with firm-level and CEO-
level controls and exhibit somewhat stronger correlations among themselves. The strongest
positive within-sample correlation arises between the investment-grade bond yield spread and
the unemployment rate (0.562) and the strongest negative correlation between the recession
indicator and the S&P 500 return (-0.587) (see Table OA1 in Online Appendix 1).
Figures 1 and 2 show the evolution of firm size throughout CEOs’ careers. We depict
the average market capitalization (y-axis) at the time of the job market entry (x-axis) and,
on each other separate plot, the average firm sizes 10, 20 and 30 years after the job market
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entry. In Figure 1, we plot the in-sample average market capitalizations for all firms for
which we have data in a given year 10 years, 20 years or 30 years after the initial year. To
capture the macroeconomic conditions at the time of the market entry, we also include a
dotted line: it shows the annual S&P 500 index return during the career-start years. Up
to the mid-1970s and from the mid-1980s on, we can observe procyclicality demonstrating
itself as the very similar shapes of the plots of the S&P 500 return and the average market
capitalization at the start of career. In Figure 2, we plot the average market capitalizations
only for firms where the initial CEOs work for 10 years, 20 years or 30 years. We focus on
the same cohort of future CEOs through time. The attrition is, naturally, more pronounced
in this graph (as shown by the changes in the numbers of observations below the line chart).
If our hypothesis on the persistence of conditions at the first job holds true, we would
expect very similar shapes for all full lines in the two figures. For example, individuals
who started their career at smaller (worse quality/less successful) firms, would also work on
average for smaller firms 10, 20 or 30 years later. However, such pattern does not emerge in
any of the figures. The lines for average firm sizes take on very diverging shapes; more often
than not they exhibit very weak similarity in shape. More frequently in Figure 2 than in
Figure 1, they intersect on several instances which means that CEOs who started out at a
larger firm may later end up either in a smaller firm, or in a larger firm - there is no pattern
identifiable or easily perceptible from the plots. Furthermore, the full lines for average
firm size at the start of career correspond to the shape of the dotted lines representing the
macro conditions at the start of career only to a very small extent. Although the number
of observations for each depicted entry year is fairly equally distributed, we need to keep in
mind the selection bias in our data. All the individuals we consider become CEOs at some
point. Some of them become CEOs faster than others (on average, they take around 20
years), so the period for which we can follow each of them in their CEO position in our data
is also quite different (on average, 7.5 years).
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3 Empirical methodology
We base our empirical methodology on Graham et al.’s (2012) executive compensation speci-
fication. It is a version of the classic Mincerian earnings function augmented to include fixed
effects to address omitted-variable bias. Fixed effects estimation however cannot address
all instances when explanatory variables and idiosyncratic errors are correlated. Omitted-
variable bias may arise due to unobserved time-varying factors, measurement errors, or si-
multaneous responses to exogenous shocks.16 Instrumental variable regressions may address
several issues in our panel affected by selection and endogeneity. The small percentage of
within-sample movers as well as the smaller statistical power in firm fixed effects when we
have a large number of firms relatively to the sample size give us further incentives to engage
in instrumental variables estimation.
Our approach in the instrumental variables estimation is similar to that of Oyer (2006;
2008): our start-of-career measure is a proxy for first placement success (First Firm Size).
We instrument our main explanatory variable with measures for macroeconomic conditions
at the start of the individual’s career. The regressor of interest in our case is just a “more
lagged” version of a firm-level control (the lag varies between 2 and 55 years). Individuals
may choose when and in which firm they start their careers but instrumenting should capture
the variation in first jobs beyond the individuals’ control.17
As a point of departure in examining the persistent effect of first job circumstances, we
16Under fixed effect estimation here we also include least squares dummy variable estimation.
17Schoar and Zuo (2012) have a slightly different approach. With their “recession CEO” indicator variable,
they directly control for whether the individual started her career during a recession year. They account
for possible self-selection and timing one’s job market market entry by instrumenting the “recession CEO”
dummy with the individual’s year of birth plus 24, the average age at which the individuals in their sample
enter the job market. This timing is probably more relevant for individuals with average abilities. As
discussed for example in (Oyer, 2006), “superstar” employees are likely to be hired without regard to the
phase of the business cycle.
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define the following pooled OLS regression:
Log(Comp)jt = α + βLog(FirstF irmSize)i,t−k +Xj,t(−1)γ + Y i(t)δ + εjt (1)
where j, i, t and k indicate companies, individuals, current years and the time that passed
since the job market entry, respectively. Log(Comp)jt is firm j ’s CEO’s log-transformed com-
pensation (TDC1 or TDC2) at time t. Log(FirstF irmSize)i,t−k is the log-transformed size
of the firm where the current CEO i started her career.18 Xj,t(−1) represents the vector of
firm-level controls. They correspond to the controls used in managerial compensation regres-
sions in Graham et al. (2012). We control for firm size (lagged one period, log-transformed),
market-to-book ratio (lagged one period), return on assets (both current and lagged one pe-
riod), stock return (both current and lagged one period) and stock return volatility (during
five years up to and including the current year). Y i(t) represents the vector of CEO-level
controls. We include indicators for holding an MBA degree, for being a powerful CEO in
terms of chairing the board of directors, and for being a female CEO. In addition, we control
for CEO tenure (a log-transformed variable).
The simple pooled OLS regressions are expanded to include year dummies (τt, to control
for time fixed effects), year dummies and industry dummies, and eventually, as in Eq. (2)
below, year and firm fixed effects (ιj):
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Log(Comp)jt = βLog(FirstF irmSize)i,t−k +Xj,t(−1)γ + Y i(t)δi(t) + τt + ιj + εjt (2)
18As for the coefficient estimates of interest, we report regression results with First Market Capitaliza-
tion(main tables of results) and First Total Assets (due to similarity with the market capitalization results,
reported in the online appendix). Note that for greater consistency, the current (lagged) firm size control
variable corresponds to the first firm size variable; with First Market Capitalization, we use log-transformed
lagged current market capitalization, and with First Total Assets, we use log-transformed lagged current
total assets.
19We identify industries according to the Fama-French 12 industry classification.
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In the interpretation of results from the latter, we need to keep in mind that due to a small
percentage of within-sample movers (less than 1%), applying firm fixed effects is almost
equivalent to including CEO fixed effects. Graham et al. (2012) highlight the importance
of including both firm and managerial fixed effect in compensation regressions to avoid
misleading coefficient estimates.20 But they also point out that controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity should correspond to the goals of the research. When dealing with variables
that vary cross-sectionally or are highly time-persistent, fixed effects may wipe out the
variation of interest. Since our main variable of interest, the firm size at the start of a
career, is time-invariant and fixed for each individual, CEO fixed effects would pick up this
influence and distort the estimation of first firm size effects.
We run the pooled OLS and other specifications for the full sample as well as for two
subsamples. Subsample 1 is obtained from the full sample by applying the condition that the
time difference between starting the first job in a public firm and becoming a CEO is at least
10 years. The idea is to decrease the influence of possible firm size/performance persistence
on current CEO compensation. Subsample 2 is obtained from Subsample 1 by applying the
additional condition that the individual is not more than 30 years of age at the start of her
career (in a public firm). Thus we intend to examine the effects for observations for which we
are probably capturing the very beginning of an individual’s career. A drawback of applying
the two conditions is a significant decrease in the number of observations. We lose more
than half of observations by moving from the full sample to Subsample 2.
Controlling for time-invariant firm heterogeneities in panel data may take us beyond cor-
relation analysis and can be considered suggestive of a causal relationship going from - in
our case - first firm size to current CEO compensation. Instrumental variables estimation
(in this case, two-step least squares, 2SLS) can be used as another technique to study causal
20According to Graham et al.’s (2012) results, manager fixed effects and firm fixed effects contribute
significantly to their model’s R-squared. The fraction of the model sum of squares corresponding to manager
fixed effects and firm fixed effects is 54% and 25%, respectively.
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relationships. The success of the technique lies in the choice of instruments. These instru-
ments should be strong, valid and take proper account of possible heterogeneous responses
of economic agents (Murray, 2006).21 Instruments always represent a somewhat arbitrary
choice but require a lot of sophistication in order to establish credibility in the results. The
consistency of instrumental variables estimation may be defeated by huge inefficiency issues,
even to the point that instrumental variables estimation does not offer any advantage over
largely biased inconsistent OLS estimates.
We use two sets of instruments, each of which includes three variables. The financial-
markets-related set of excluded instruments comprises the one-year S&P 500 volume change,
one-year S&P 500 return and two-year S&P 500 standard deviation. The set of macroeconomic-
conditions-related instruments includes the recession indicator, the investment-grade bond
yield spread and the one-year average US unemployment rate. We also run instrumental
variables regressions with a single instrument by including each variable from the previous
two instrumental variable sets separately. This helps understand the particular influence
and contribution of each of the instrumental variables to the results. “Reduced-form” re-
gressions serve as another robustness check for the relationship between variables that are
separated in the two stages of 2SLS. In these regressions, instruments enter in the main
equation, replacing the instrumented main variable of interest. “Reduced-form” equations
serve as important checks for the instruments’ intuition, and if the instruments are valid,
these equations are estimated consistently with OLS (Murray, 2006).
All individuals in our sample become CEOs at some point in their career. After the
panel data analysis, we turn to cross-sectional regressions by examining the effects of first
21We are studying a group of individuals all of whom eventually become CEOs. To the point that this
group may be considered less heterogeneous than, for example, a large cohort of workers with different job
attainments, we can expect less heterogeneous reactions to the changes in the business cycle. This certainly
does not imply that by studying the given group of individuals and their employers we ensure capturing the
economically interesting responses.
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job conditions on first CEO compensation:
Log(FirstComp)i = α + βLog(FirstF irmSize)i +Xjγ + Y iδ + εi (3)
where Log(FirstComp)i represents the individual i ’s first compensation (TDC1 or TDC2)
as CEO. As before, Log(FirstF irmSize)i may stand for First Market Capitalization or First
Total Assets. We then replace Log(FirstF irmSize)i in Eq. (3) with the TopTeni indicator,
or directly with several variables from among the instruments that characterize the macroe-
conomic conditions at the time of the individual’s first job or at the time of her graduation.
Note that the cross-sections for when we employ macro variables as main explanatory vari-
ables are larger compared to the previous cross-sectional samples since we are not required
to have information on the individuals’ first employers. Data on macroeconomic conditions
at the time of the job market entry are more widely available than company data.
4 Results
In Subsection 4.1, we discuss the results from employing the empirical methodology suggested
in Section 3. Some of these tests already serve as robustness checks to the benchmark results.
In Subsection 4.2, we offer and discuss further considerations to test the robustness of the
main results.
4.1 Main results
Table 2 presents our benchmark results. We run pooled OLS, least squares dummy vari-
able (LSDV) regressions and fixed effects regressions with the full sample and Subsamples
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1 and 2. The results from the simplest of the specifications, pooled OLS, suggest a statis-
tically strongly significant association between first firm size and CEO compensation. The
effect amounts to 3.57%, 4.11% and 4.39% for a one-standard-deviation change in First
Market Capitalization for the full sample, Subsample 1 and Subsample 2, respectively. (A
one-standard-deviation change in First Market Capitalization is 2.58-times the full-sample
mean.) Similarly, when total assets are used as the firm size control as in Table OA3 in
Online Appendix 3, the estimates on First Total Assets suggest a strongly statistically sig-
nificant effect of approximately 3% for the full sample and Subsample 1, and 4.83% for
Subsample 2. After we control for more factors by including year dummies and year and
industry dummies, the estimated effects corresponding to a one-standard-deviation change
in first firm size slightly decrease but are still between 2 and 3%. The statistical significance
of these results is lower; for TDC2, however, we do not obtain significant results.
Firm fixed effects may partially control for causality. In all but one of the fixed effects
regressions, the effect of first firm size on CEO compensation is not found to be statistically
significant. The coefficient estimates on first firm size become rather small (under 1%),
in some cases negative. In Panel C of Table 2, the estimated effect of a one-standard-
deviation change in first firm size on TDC2 is large, 10.53%, but statistically significant
only at the 10% level. In Table OA3, with total assets as the control for firm size, we find
overall less statistically significant results. The absence of statistically significant results
in the regressions with firm fixed effects may have two different interpretations: there are
indeed no persistent effects in first job conditions on CEO pay, suggesting the executive job
market is efficient and does not reward CEOs for good initial conditions. The other possible
explanation is the lack of variation in the observations (little within-firm variation, large
number of firms for too few observations), and thus lack of support in the data to perform
a firm fixed effect regression.
Instrumental variables (IV) regressions are another possibility to explore causal effects
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going from first job conditions to CEO compensation. Panel A of Table 3 reports the results
from instrumenting First Market Capitalization with the set of financial-markets-related
instruments. There are no positive and statistically significant results. The estimates suggest
a large, in most cases negative effect on CEO pay for both TDC1 and TDC2. Individuals
starting their career in smaller firms (in worse economic times) earn on average approximately
between 30% to 50% more for a one-standard-deviation change in firm size. The signs of
the coefficients for the instruments based on the S&P 500 are as expected, although the
positive signs of the strongly statistically significant estimates for the S&P 500 volatility are
not straightforward to interpret. Accumulated empirical evidence suggests that causality
between financial market volatility and recessions works in both directions (e.g., Hamilton
and Lin, 1996; Engle et al., 2008). Higher uncertainty in the financial markets may be
reflected in higher volatility of the financial markets and may trigger a recession. Our
volatility measure covers the two years before the individual’s job market entry. The results
suggest a strong positive association between First Market Capitalization and stock market
volatility on average. The possible effect of a recession in that it decreases the average
market capitalization may show up later, when stock market volatility is lower, but it could
be induced also by this larger volatility.
When employing the set of proxies for macroeconomic conditions as instruments in Panel
B of Table 3, there are less statistically significant results. The estimated effects are, again,
negative, suggesting that starting out at a company larger by one standard deviation leads
to lower CEO compensation (TDC1) by as much as 30%. Although the estimates of the
macro instruments in the first stage are not statistically significant at conventional levels,
they are of the expected sign. The overidentification tests in both Panel A and B of Table 3
all fail to reject the null and suggest that our instruments are not weak. The endogeneity
tests fail to reject the null in a number of cases, thus suggesting that we might be better off
using non-IV regressions.
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When running the IV tests with each instrument separately (Table 4), all coefficient
estimates on First Market Capitalization are negative and suggest large negative effects on
CEO compensation for a one-standard-deviation increase in first firm size, most of them
between 20 and 80%. The results are, however, not statistically significant. Marginally
statistically significant results (at the 10% level) arise when we instrument First Market
Capitalization with S&P 500 standard deviation. For a one-standard-deviation increase
in First Market Capitalization, CEO compensation decreases by 39% and 47% for TDC1
and TDC2, respectively. The signs of the instruments’ coefficients in the first stage are
as expected; half of these coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level.22 The
results from Table 4 provide some support for the hypothesis that, as a consequence of being
rewarded for succeeding in a stricter selection process in bad economic times, starting a
career in a recession results in higher CEO pay on average.
We rerun regressions from Eq. (1) and its variations with First Firm Rank and lagged
current firm rank in place of the firm size measures. By using firm rank, we study first job
effects after flattening the variation in firm size. To establish the firm rank, we order the firms
from largest to smallest in each year and assign them their ordinal numbers. The largest
firm receives the highest number which equals the total number of firms in the group. The
rank is a number between 0 and 1, computed as n:N where n stands for the ordinal number
of the firm and N is the total number of firms. The biggest firm is ranked 1 and the smallest
very close to 0 if the number of firms in the group is large. Thus, in Table 5, we replace
First Market Capitalization with First Firm Rank based on ranking firms in each starting
year according to their initial market capitalization. The results with these “smoothed out”
data support the conclusions from Table 2. Good conditions at the start of a career may
22The regressions in Table 4 (more detailed results are in Table OA4 in Online Appendix 4) also include
regressions with Schoar and Zuo’s (2012) recession year indicator as one of the instruments (see Table A2 in
Appendix 2 for variable definitions). The sign of its coefficient estimate is positive, opposite to that of our
recession indicator. Additional tests (unreported) using an indicator variable that equals one when our and
the Schoar and Zuo indicators differ suggest that this might be the consequence of Schoar and Zuo’s (2012)
recession year indicator capturing on average mild but still positive economic activity while our recession
indicator captures only adverse conditions.
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lead to higher CEO compensation but the question remains whether we control for sufficient
factors in these regressions. The coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level for
all specifications with TDC1 as the response variable, except for when we control for firm
fixed effects. The size of the effects corresponding to a one-standard-deviation increase in
the measure of firm size is larger than in Table 2, between 6 and 12% for specifications in
Columns (1)-(3) of Table 5. As for TDC2, we obtain strong results only in the simplest,
the pooled OLS specification (Column 5). Overall, the effects are slightly stronger for the
regressions where we set the upper limit for the age at the start of one’s career to 30 years
(see Panel C of Table 5).
Another variable to characterize the conditions of first employment in a public company is
Top Ten. Following Schoar and Zuo (2012), Top Ten is an indicator variable that equals one
if the individual started her career in one of the following top-ten firms: Arthur Andersen,
AT&T, DuPont, Ford, General Electric, General Motors, IBM, McKinsey, Procter & Gamble,
and Texas Instruments (Schoar and Zuo, 2012, p. 9). When we characterize start-of-career
success as working for a top-ten firm, the findings do not differ much from those in Tables 2
and 5. In Table 6, we report results from LSDV regressions with year and industry dummies,
using the full sample and both subsamples. Market capitalization is the measure for firm
size. The estimates suggest a long-term positive effect between 12-14.5% of starting a career
in a top-ten firm on CEOs’ TDC1 compensation. The effects are statistically significant (at
the 5% level) for TDC1 in the role of the response variable for the full sample only. The
average effect on TDC2 amounts to 5.7-9% but these results are not statistically significant
at conventional levels.23
To further study the persistence of effects of the start-of-career conditions on CEO com-
pensation, we run “reduced-form” regressions in which macroeconomic variables that serve
23Table OA6 in Online Appendix 6 reports the results with total assets as the control for firm size. The
results are similar. The coefficients on Top Ten are all positive, of comparable magnitude, and significant at
the 5% level for TDC1 in both the full sample and Subsample 1.
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as instruments in the instrumental variables regressions now appear as the main explana-
tory variable. This allows us to look at the time closest to our individuals’ career start -
at the first employment and at graduation.24 We do not need first firm data here; we use
data on macroeconomic conditions that are more widely available. We focus on variables
whose influence on CEO pay we hypothesize is indirect, through first firm size. In Table 7,
we report results with the specification including year and industry dummies, with the full
sample, and with market capitalization as the control for current firm size.25 The estimates
are not statistically significant at conventional levels and their signs largely vary, suggesting
no long-term impact of the start-of-career conditions - whether macroeconomic conditions
at the start of the first job or at graduation - on CEO pay. Schoar and Zuo’s (2012) reces-
sion year indicator at graduation is the only exception here. The coefficient estimate on the
recession year indicator suggests a rather large negative effect, 9%, on CEO compensation
(TDC1) which is strongly statistically significant (at the 1% level). Finding a negative effect
supports the hypothesis of procyclical cohort effects in compensation and imprinting effects
at the start of future CEOs’ career. It might be the case that the recession year indicator is
a better characterization of initial conditions, capturing influences that the other variables
do not, but persistence in firm size may also be driving the results (the results are from
regressions on the full sample).
Even if the results concerning persistent effects of first job conditions on CEO pay remain
weak or ambivalent, circumstances at the start of future CEOs’ career may influence their
first CEO compensation. In Table 8, we present these results. The estimates are statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level for all regressions on TDC1 - granted compensation. We
run regressions with Subsamples CS and CS1.26 Working for a larger firm, both in terms
24The first employer may be a private firm for which data is not available at all, or at least it is not easily
obtainable.
25Panel B of Table OA7 in Online Appendix 7 reports the results with total assets as the control for
current firm size. The results are similar.
26Subsample CS is a cross section obtained by selecting the observations with the very first CEO pay for
each CEO. For more details on the subsamples, see Table A1 in Appendix 1.
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of market capitalization and total assets, or for a top-ten firm at the beginning of the in-
dividuals’ career contributes to a larger CEO compensation. Since all individuals in our
sample become CEOs in a S&P 1,500 company, we capture the effect of the promotion to
a public company CEO position for the first time.27 A one-standard-deviation increase in
firm size is associated with 3-5% higher CEO compensation (we obtain a larger effect on
TDC1 than on TDC2). The effect of starting out at a top-ten firm is approximately 26%
for TDC1, about 10 times larger than for the one-standard-deviation increase in first firm
size. The estimates on the top-ten indicator are not statistically significant at convetional
levels for TDC2 as the CEO pay measure. In Table OA8 in Online Appendix 8, we report
results from “reduced-form” cross-sectional regressions: as in Table 7, the macroeconomic
conditions at the time of the first job and at graduation are employed as main explanatory
variables. A number of estimates is now strongly statistically significant. For TDC1, the
effects of conditions at graduation are moderately higher than at the start of the first job. A
one-standard-deviation increase in unemployment rate (1.5%) represents a 3.7% increase in
first CEO pay (TDC1) if at the start of the first job and 5% if at graduation. The respective
effects for a one-standard-deviation increase in the bond-yield spread (0.5%) are 5% and
6% for TDC1, and 4.7% and 6% for TDC2. The direction of estimated effects supports the
hypothesis of granting larger compensations for CEOs hired in turbulent economic times.
Thus, to be hired in a recession may mean passing a stricter, more careful selection process,
a sign of better skills and qualities which are rewarded correspondingly.
In Table 9, we replicate selected regressions from Table IV and Panel B of Table V
in Schoar and Zuo (2012) using our data so as to perform further testing of the first job
effects on the first CEO compensation. These regressions examine the effects of the first job
27Graham et al. (2012) discuss the promotion versus the person-specific effects in the context of their
empirical model with manager fixed effects.
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conditions on the first CEO compensation under a different (simpler) specification:
Log(FirstComp)i = α + βRecessionY eari + τd + ιs + εi (4)
where Log(FirstComp)i is the first CEO compensation (TDC1 or TDC2, log-transformed)
of individual i and RecessionY eari is the recession year indicator for the year when indi-
vidual i started her career. Schoar and Zuo (2012) control for decade and industry fixed
effects where d denotes the decade in which the CEO was born and s is the industry in
which the individual started her career.28 The alternative specifications replace Recession
Year with the Top Ten indicator and/or add firm-level controls (Total Assets, Return on
Assets and Sales). Except for the specification in Column (6) of our Table 9, the signs of
the estimates on the recession year indicator as the main explanatory variable are negative.
This suggests that individuals who start their careers in a “recession year” receive lower first
CEO compensation, but the estimates are not statistically significant at conventional levels.
According to the Schoar and Zuo regression specifications where the top-ten indicator is the
main explanatory variable, all but the estimate in Column (8) are statistically significant at
the 1% level. The positive effects on the first CEO compensation suggested by the estimates
are very large: 84% on TDC1 (Column 3), but it decreases to 35% on TDC1 when current
firm controls are included (Column 4), and to 38% on TDC2 in the specification without
current firm controls (Column 7). The results in Schoar and Zuo (2012) are obtained with
a smaller number of observations and are stronger for the recession year indicator than for
the top-ten indicator. Our results further support the findings from our Table 8 that the
first CEO pay (at least for the compensation measured by TDC1) may be as much as 30%
higher if the individual started her career in a top-ten public company.
28The industries are identified according to the first SIC digit.
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4.2 Robustness analysis
If all individuals in our sample were movers, that is, if all CEOs could be observed in at least
one other firm, employing firm fixed effects would be a useful strategy to quantify the first
firm size effects. As discussed above, this is not the case, thus the coefficient estimates of first
firm size may be conflated (firm fixed effects wipe out the time-constant between-manager
variation). These estimates may also be otherwise altered due to possible omitted variable
bias.
Despite the data issues, we can still get an idea of a distortion in coefficient estimates
if we perform cross-section regressions for selected years.29 Table 10 reports the results
from such cross-section regressions, with market capitalization as the measure for firm size.
(Table OA10 in Online Appendix 10 reports the results with total assets as the control for
firm size.) The selected years are 1995, 2000 and 2005. 2005 is the year with the largest
number of observations, 1995 and 2000 were selected to representatively cover and be evenly
spread out throughout the data period 1992-2007. When we compare the magnitudes, signs
and statistical significance of coefficients in Table 2 to the ones in Table 10 (or, alternatively,
those in Table OA3 to the ones in Table OA10), the coefficients of the control variables
remain rather stable. The coefficients of interest are low in magnitude, not very different
from to the ones obtained in the benchmark regressions with firm fixed effects. The estimated
coefficients on first firm size are not statistically significant at conventional levels. Only First
Market Capitalization is positively associated with the 2000 TDC1 compensation at the 5%
level (Column 2 in Panel B of Table 10); similarly for First Total Assets and TDC2 in
Column 6 in Panel A of Table OA10.30
29Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) use one-year regression as a robustness check to a model driven by
between-firm variation, a model where using firm-fixed effects may be fallacious.
30On an interesting note, the results in both Table OA9 and Table OA10 suggest that in the mid-nineties,
female CEO may have earned significantly less than male CEOs. 1995 is the year with least observations so
this may affect the results but the 1% significance holds not only for the full sample but for Subsample 2 as
well.
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We make another attempt for instrumental variables estimation with a set of employment-
related variables (the US annual employment rate, the US annual employment growth rate,
and the interaction term of the former two variables). In the context of studying cohort
effect in promotions, Kwon et al. (2010) find that employment rate in interaction with the
employment growth rate matter more than the unemployment rate alone. The key to this
argument is that the employment growth rate is a variable reflecting economic prospects, a
forward-looking variable. Reported in Table OA11 in the Online Appendix 11, all tests, from
partial correlations and first-stage R-squared through weak identification tests and endogene-
ity tests, indicate that we are probably better off without engaging in 2SLS estimation. The
coefficients on First Firm Size are not statistically significant at conventional levels, they
may carry very large bias and thus be misleading. Nevertheless, our tests with alternative
instruments can be credited with a careful evaluation of theoretical arguments supported by
previous empirical research.
Advances in instrumental variables estimation due to the work of Moreira (2003) and
Mikusheva (2010) allow for weak-instrument robust testing with conditional likelihood ratio
(CLR) confidence sets. We report these results in Table 11. The first row of each panel
contains the coefficient estimates of First Market Capitalization obtained through normal
approximation. We include this coefficient’s limited information maximum likelihood (LIML)
estimates for comparison as well as some first-stage diagnostics. Columns (3) and (6) of each
panel contain perhaps the most important results - the results from LSDV estimation with
year and industry dummies.31 With the financial-markets-related and the employment-rate-
related sets of instruments, we find CLR confidence sets with a rather large span (the p-values
are large but so are the sets). When the set of macro variables is used as instruments, the
CLR confidence sets become narrower. The results are strongly statistically significant and
31The data does not support fixed-effect 2SLS estimation. Also, the results for TDC1 are likely to be less
erratic (although one may argue that the Black and Scholes model is not the most appropriate to determine
the value of the stock options granted). TDC2 includes the value of exercised stock options, thus it is more
likely to be affected by measurement error.
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suggest a negative effect of first firm size on CEO compensation. The suggested first firm size
elasticity relative to CEO compensation varies between -0.1 and -0.8% (taking into account
all CLR-confidence-set results in Column (3) in all panels of Table 11). The negative sign
lends support to the countercyclical cohort effects theory: individuals who due to the bad
economy started their careers in smaller firms on average, earn higher CEO compensation.
Thus, again, to succeed and be hired in a bad economy could be a sign of higher ability.
During recessions, firms may apply stricter selection processes in order to find the best
match, the most able employees. When performing the weak instrument robust testing with
Subsample 2 (untabulated results), the results suggest positive effects which, in most cases,
are not statistically significant at conventional levels. Cohort effects seem to be inexistent
in CEO compensation when we pick observations with the earliest possible stages of the
individuals’ careers but we have to keep in mind the much lower number of observations
used to obtain these results.
5 Conclusion
Several recent papers study the possible influence of initial career conditions on individuals’
current professional situation. They find that a good economy makes it more likely to
start one’s career in a position with better opportunities and plays a role in shaping one’s
career path in the long term. So much so that those whose initial placement is a worse
match may not be able to catch up to their luckier peers. We study CEOs in publicly
listed companies and investigate whether the conditions at the time these individuals start
their careers influence their current CEO compensation. Do CEOs whose job market entry
coincides with a bad economy earn less than their counterparts who started their first job
assignment in peaks and booms?
We test the influence of the quality of initial placement through pooled ordinary least
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squares, least square dummy variables and fixed effects regressions, as well as instrumental
variables regressions. We do not find evidence that first firm size has a persistent procyclical
effect on CEO compensation. Thus, the niche of the job market seems to play a role in how
persistent first job effects are. Even if first positions influence subsequent job attainment
and compensation, more than two decades into the individuals’ careers this effect seems
to disappear when it comes to (future) CEOs. The several layers of selection - selection
based on following only future CEOs and selection due to different initial macroeconomic
conditions for each cohort - represent more of an issue if a long-term significant effect is at
work. Our principal finding (lack of a long-term significant effect) hence alleviates the data
selection concerns to some extent. The results from instrumental variables estimation lend
support to the notion of countercyclical cohort effects in CEO compensation.
Our results from cross-section regressions suggest that initial career conditions (firm
size, top-ten firm) have a large effect on the first CEO compensation. A large part of the
pay increase - as much as 30% - comes from factors positively correlated with initial job
conditions. The increase in first CEO compensation due to initial job conditions dissipates
over time, suggesting efficient workings of the executive job market. A number of robustness
checks support these conclusions.
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